The snap poll, called by NDP Premier David Eby two days after the resignation of BC Conservative leader Kerry-Lynne Findlay, received some criticism as being without precedent in Canadian history – an incumbent calling an election shortly after the Official Opposition becoming leaderless (not having an accepted permanent replacement)
Previously the NDP were ahead in polling, by a few points on average. The BC Conservatives since the last election suffered dissension within their ranks, with the breakaway OneBC and British Columbia parties forming with disaffected former BC Conservatives.
The BC Liberals, forming government from 2001-17, were wiped out in the last election as BC United. A number of prominent former MLAs sought to continue a more centrist political movement with CentreBC forming in 2025.
Neither OneBC nor CentreBC are expected to do particularly well in this election, although the Green Party, led by Emily Lowan, is expected to make gains in the popular vote, conventionally seen as more (negatively) impactful to the NDP.
The BC Conservatives executive board selected MLA Lorne Dickerson as interim leader, with some expressed intent to make his position in the party permanent should he become elected Premier. Dickerson has previously been involved in publishing and financial consulting prior to his first election to the BC Legislature in 2020 as a BC Liberal
The BC Conservatives last won power in their own right in 1928 under Simon Fraser Tolmie, with the Great Depression and internal divisions contributing to his defeat to Liberal Thomas Dufferin “Duff” Pattullo in 1933. They did help form a coalition government with the Liberals in 1945 to help keep the left-wing Co-operative Commonwealth Federation out of power, however by the early 1950s the primary right-of-centre political standard bearer was the Social Credit Party, governing from 1952-72 and then from 1975-91. The Conservatives, (or the Progressive Conservatives) during those years were routinely shut out of the legislature altogether, although on occasion they might pick up one or two seats (1972, 1975).
BC politics has generally tended towards polarization, with the CCF/NDP being the main force for left-of-centre politics since 1933, and the centre to right-of-centre being variously represented by Liberals, Coalition, Social Credit, Liberals and once again the Conservatives after Liberals losses in 2020 and the collapse of BC United in 2024.
This election promises to be no different with respect to polarization, with more than three quarters of the seats expected to be won by margins of 5% or more, and more than a third of the seats by 20% or more. The election will be won primarily with tight margins in the lower mainland suburban ridings, with little change expected in the BC Interior (largely Conservative) and Vancouver and Victoria (largely NDP)
Throughout all of the interior part of the province, 25 ridings being identified in various interior regions, the two ridings to keep an eye on are expected to be Kootenay Central, with NDP cabinet minister Brittny Anderson expected to be in tight race, and Vernon-Lumby with NDP incumbent and cabinet minister Harwinder Sandhu expected to struggle to hold on to her seat there. Historically Vernon-Lumby has supported right-leaning parties, this might be the one pickup for Conservatives, who already hold twenty-one or the twenty-five seats in the interior.
Moving towards Vancouver in the Fraser Valley – Langley -Maple Ridge part of the province, the BC Conservatives already holding 9 out of the 10 ridings, Maple Ridge – Pitt Meadows, held by NDP Education and Childcare Minister Lisa Beare, is expected to be the closest riding in this area.
On the lower mainland, the BC Conservatives might win as many as ten seats, with a high portion of ridings being decided by margins of less than 10%. The NDP are expected to go from their four seats in Surrey to possibly one or none. They might be able to hang onto their Coquitlam seats more readily, while Burnaby promises to be the area where NDP losses could become more of a rout. The NDP won all 5 Burnaby seats last time. They might lose one seat at current polling levels, or as many as four.
In Vancouver city proper, the left-of-centre orientation of the city is expected to hold up, (a Green Party candidate, Pete Fry, just being elected as mayor recently). Possible flips to the Conservatives might include Langara and Yaletown, but probably not much else. West Vancouver-Sea to Sky is expected to return Green Jeremy Valeriote to the legislature.
On Vancouver Island and Victoria, up to half the races might be competitive within five points, with Juan de Fuca – Malahat and Ladysmith Oceanside being the likeliest areas for BC Conservative gains. Otherwise, a lot of the area is expected to remain NDP orange, and Emily Lowan expected to hold Saanich North and the Islands for the Greens
The main takeaway of the election might be that the trend of incumbent Premiers calling early elections (such as Houston in Nova Scotia and Ford in Ontario) and receiving strong majorities might be at an end. National crisis governments, such as during COVID-19 and trade tensions with the United States, generally tend to favour incumbents but as former CAQ Premier Christine Frechette in Quebec can attest, that does not always guarantee a return to power. The NDP might be defeated, but most of their urban support will remain intact, and the early election call will factor prominently in any post-election autopsy. The BC Conservatives, despite all the floor crossing and third-party breakaways, led by an interim leader, would achieve an historic victory, their first in 98 years.
Despite low levels (<30%) of the popular vote, the Parti Quebecois as led by Paul St.-Pierre Plamondon, is looking at a very small majority, largely due to vote splits from the other parties and the inability of any of them to form a strong province-wide opposition to the separatist PQ Party. Their vote is the most efficient, in many cases taking ridings on 2 or 3 way splits of the non-PQ vote. Reminiscent of 1994, where the PQ was expected to win, ended up with a strong majority but only tied the Liberals in popular vote.
Liberals, projected to be Official Opposition, look to improve on their popular vote total, strengthen their hold on traditional Liberal ridings in and around Montreal, but do not look to make significant gains outside of their urban base
Quebec Solidaire, while declining in vote share, manages to hang on to more than half of their seats from 2022, and continue to be a force in urban areas of the province
The Conservatives, looking to make gains for the first time since the Union Nationale last won seats in 1976, are expected to do well in the Quebec City region and central parts of the province, more or less aligned to those areas where the federal Conservatives hold ridings
The governing CAQ suffers a devasting defeat, (as has been expected for the last several years), although they are not wiped out (as has been predicted by multiple pundits), managing to salvage representation in the Mauricie areas
All main party leaders are expected to win the seats they are running for
The most likely outcome, (unless the PQ can expand their majority through by-elections or defections from other parties, which PM Carney has successfully done to achieve a majority in Ottawa), would be an election call in less than 4 years’ time to seek a stronger mandate in the National Assembly
Caution should be used in extrapolating support for an independence referendum. A strong majority of Quebecois, per recent polling, remain opposed to independence. The federal Liberal Party continues to poll strongly in the province. The PQ win is more to replace the current (very unpopular) government and is similar to their wins in 1976 and 1994, where the campaign was more about good governance
Finally, it should be noted that should the PQ form a majority government with less than 33% of the vote, that (as best as I have researched) would be a record low percentage of the popular vote tied to an overall seat majority. The previous record holder for a majority government with low popular vote was the UK General Election in 2024, with Labour getting a strong majority with only 33.7% of the popular vote, (again, profiting from vote splits not dissimilar to Quebec this year). The previously record in Quebec for lowest popular vote tied to a majority was in 2018, where 37.4% was enough for then-Premier Francois Legault to form a robust majority government of 74 seats.
While no other party is expected to come close to forming a government in Quebec this year (assuming the polls are at least somewhat accurate), I would put the odds of a PQ majority vs. minority are 60%-40%, respectively, reflecting the tight margins in many of the individual races. I would give the second-place Liberals a 95% chance of forming the Official Opposition.
Malgré de faibles niveaux d’appuis sous la barre des 30 % du vote populaire, le Parti Québécois mené par Paul St-Pierre Plamondon s’aligne vers une très mince majorité. Cela s’explique en grande partie par le fractionnement des votes chez les autres partis et l’incapacité de quiconque à former une opposition solide à l’échelle provinciale face aux indépendantistes du PQ. Le vote péquiste s’avère des plus efficaces, le parti remportant de nombreuses circonscriptions grâce à des luttes à deux ou trois candidats qui divisent le vote non-PQ. La situation rappelle celle de 1994, où le PQ, favori, avait finalement obtenu une forte majorité de sièges tout en arrivant à égalité avec les Libéraux au chapitre du vote populaire.
Le Parti libéral, projeté comme opposition officielle, cherche à améliorer son score au vote populaire et à consolider ses acquis dans ses fiefs traditionnels de la région de Montréal, mais ne semble pas en voie de faire des gains importants à l’extérieur de sa base urbaine.
Québec solidaire, malgré une baisse de sa part des voix, réussit à conserver plus de la moitié de ses sièges de 2022 et continue de s’imposer comme une force politique dans les centres urbains de la province.
Le Parti conservateur, qui tente de remporter des sièges pour la première fois depuis les victoires de l’Union Nationale en 1976, devrait obtenir de bons résultats dans la région de la capital nationale et le centre de la province. Ces gains correspondent plus ou moins aux secteurs où les conservateurs fédéraux détiennent actuellement des circonscriptions.
La CAQ, actuellement au pouvoir, subit une défaite dévastatrice (attendue depuis plusieurs années déjà). Elle n’est toutefois pas rayée de la carte comme le prédisaient plusieurs experts, réussissant à sauver les meubles avec une représentation dans la région de la Mauricie.
Tous les chefs des principaux partis devraient remporter la circonscription dans laquelle ils se présentent.
Le scénario le plus probable (à moins que le PQ n’élargisse sa majorité par le biais d’élections partielles ou de transfuges d’autres partis, une stratégie que le premier ministre Carney a employée avec succès pour obtenir une majorité à Ottawa) serait le déclenchement d’élections en moins de quatre ans afin de solliciter un mandat plus fort à l’Assemblée nationale.
Il convient de rester prudent avant d’extrapoler ces résultats sur l’appui à un référendum d’indépendance. Selon les derniers sondages, une nette majorité de Québécois demeure opposée à la souveraineté. De plus, le Parti libéral fédéral continue de récolter de bons scores dans la province. La victoire du PQ s’apparente davantage à un désir de remplacer un gouvernement actuel très impopulaire, s’inscrivant dans la lignée de ses victoires de 1976 et 1994, où la campagne électorale tournait principalement autour du thème de la bonne gouvernance.
Enfin, il est à noter que si le PQ venait à former un gouvernement majoritaire avec moins de 33 % des voix, cela constituerait (selon mes recherches) le plus bas pourcentage du vote populaire de l’histoire lié à une majorité absolue de sièges. Le précédent record pour un gouvernement majoritaire élu avec un faible vote populaire appartenait aux élections générales britanniques de 2024, où Labour avaient décroché une solide majorité avec seulement 33,7 % des voix (profitant là aussi d’une division des votes similaire à celle du Québec cette année). Au Québec, le record du plus bas pourcentage pour une majorité était détenu depuis 2018 par le premier ministre de l’époque, François Legault, alors que 37,4 % des voix avaient suffi pour former un gouvernement majoritaire robuste de 74 sièges.
Bien qu’aucun autre parti ne soit pressenti pour s’approcher du pouvoir au Québec cette année (en supposant que les sondages soient un tant soit peu précis), j’évaluerais les probabilités d’une majorité péquiste par rapport à un gouvernement minoritaire à 60 % contre 40 %, ce qui traduit les marges très serrées dans plusieurs luttes locales. J’accorde aux libéraux, en deuxième place, une probabilité de 95 % de former l’opposition officielle.
