Amidst a backdrop of multiple failed attempts to pass a Brexit deal on the part of Theresa May’s Conservative government, Tory support has dropped precipitously in the run up to a UK EU Parliament vote, (which wasn’t even slated to occur had Brexit been realized by this point).  Much of that support has gone to the Brexit Party, which led by former UKIP Leader Nigel Farage, is set to make the most gains and with the Liberal Democrats making a modest recovery in support.  The Labour Party, having largely failed to capitalize on sagging Tory fortunes, will seek to limit losses, while the smaller parties such as the Scottish Nationalists, Greens and Plaid Cymru are largely expected to have steady levels of support.

EU Parliament elections in Europe are more challenging to model since seat distribution is determined not by the traditional first-past-the-post system but instead with 12 multi-member constituencies where a total of 73 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) are elected by a more complex highest-of-averages D’Hondt method of computation in each constituency.  Coupled with the fact that historical polling data is more limited for EU Parliamentary elections and the multimember constituency method is more recent, beginning in 1999, it is not as straightforward to anticipate which constituencies will reflect a given party’s support in terms of elected MEPs.  In using a map of counting areas for the last 2 EU Parliamentary elections plus a review of the statistics of where increases and decreases of national party support have figured in the constituency results, I have developed a rough approximation of where each of the main parties can expect to elected MEPs.  (see below)

The immediate impacts of the election will be hard to determine since there is a three day lag between the end of voting (May 23rd) and the announcement of the results (May 26th), and during that time the not insignificant occurrence of Prime Minister May’s resignation was announced after another failed attempt to get the UK Parliament to pass a Brexit deal.  However it is anticipated that the stark result in the EU Parliament elections might force the Conservatives into a survival mode, with a high probability that a hardline Brexiteer might succeed May in order to stave off a challenge from Farrage’s Brexit Party.  Historically EU elections have trended against the government of the day, with the end result that they are not always a portent of elections to come at Westminster.  Indeed, the Tories swept the EU elections in 1999 and 2004, only to lose to Labour in a UK general election shortly thereafter.  What makes this EU election particular noteworthy is the magnitude of the defeat of the party in power in Westminster, and how it might change the dynamics with the upcoming Conservative leadership election, both of which are unprecedented.  Conservatives are undoubtedly hoping that relatively poor track record of EU elections predicting the victor in the next national elections is the one precedent that holds.

 

 

 

 

PCs 47% and 21 seats

Liberals 42% and 17 seats

NDP 8.5% and 2 seats

At this point, the Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) election appears to be a tossup, with perhaps a slight edge to the PCs in public opinion polls. If the PCs are successful, it would mark the 6th consecutive provincial vote where an incumbent government was tossed from power, an ominous sign for the federal Liberals as their provincial counterparts would have been removed from power in 5 of those 6 elections. This is also unusual for NL in that incumbent governments have been reelected at least twice after their initial win.

At this point, polls have consistently shown that the incumbent Liberal Premier, Dwight Ball, is not overly popular. The Liberals since regaining power in 2015 slipped fairly dramatically after their first austerity budget, although they have recovered moderately since that time. The PCs have at least partly succeeded in rebranding themselves after the Muskrat Falls debacle during their last government with Ches Crosbie, son of the national icon John Crosbie at the helm. Perhaps more remarkably, the NDP under Allison Coffin has managed to field only 14 candidates out of the 40 seats up for grabs, this is largely attributed to the snap election call Premier Ball made earlier this spring that limited the NDP’s recruitment and nomination process. The Newfoundland and Labrador Party, with nearly a comparable number of candidates to the NDP, has likewise been unable to make much headway despite a widespread feeling of malaise with both parties.

Thus the election might be seen as more in line with other recent provincial results from British Columbia and New Brunswick, where the incumbents were thought to have a decent shot at reelection, perhaps won the popular vote but narrowly lost in seats. In contrast with New Brunswick, PEI and Quebec, however, the disenchantment in NL will not likely lead to a dramatic breakthrough for new parties.

The last election was characterized by lopsided margins in many ridings, chiefly won by the Liberals, including 3 ridings won by over 90% of the vote (very unusual for contested parliamentary elections). This lack of voting efficiency might prevent their return to power, but if a swing to the PCs is modest and consistent throughout the province, a wide margin in 2015 might also serve to limit their loses. The PC gains will likewise be limited by the fact that the NDP is not on the ballot in 26 out of the 40 ridings, making the Liberals a likely repository of progressive votes that might otherwise have gone NDP orange.

At the end of the day, however, the modest swings necessary to pick up seats in St. John’s and environs, and the Avalon peninsula, will likely push the PCs to at least a plurality, if not a majority of seats. The model shows that while a PC majority is the most probable outcome, a Liberal minority (propped up by the NDP) is also quite possible. Less probable is a PC minority (if they get 19 or 20 seats and persuade an opposition member to assume the speakership), and last in the order of probability would be the Liberals returning to power with an overall majority.

While St. John’s environs and the Avalon is key to PC prospects of winning, Labrador may ultimately prove decisive in the overall result. The model currently shows the PCs winning Labrador West by 6 votes over the NDP (their only realistic hope outside of St. John’s), and Lake Melville by 3 votes over the Liberals. Other areas of critical PC gains would be certain ridings in Eastern and Central Newfoundland, such as Placentia West – Bellevue and Grand Falls-Windsor-Buchans.

The Liberals would not be shut out in any NL region except for suburban St. John’s, where the PCs are projected to take all 6 seats. They would be strongest in western Newfoundland around the Humber region and Corner Brook. The NDP, for their part, could realistically hope to retain 2 St. John’s seats – those of St. John’s Centre and St. John’s East Quidi Vidi.

Overall, the NL election continues a trend of general disenchantment with Liberal provincial governments recently seen across Canada, but it will probably differ from many of the other previous provincial contests in that third parties, with small slates of candidates, have next to no chance of any dramatic breakthrough in tomorrow’s vote. The biggest reverberations could be felt nationally, however, where at the end of 2015 Liberals held power nationally and in 7 provinces … at the end of 2019 it may well be only Yukon and Nova Scotia with Liberal governments if the one time seeming invincibility of the Liberal brand erodes so far that the Liberals are dethroned in Ottawa as well. Liberal reelection in NL could help arrest that erosion of strength, but right now the signs point in the direction of yet further Liberal decline.