Crosbie and the PCs ahead by a shade in Newfoundland

PCs 47% and 21 seats

Liberals 42% and 17 seats

NDP 8.5% and 2 seats

At this point, the Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) election appears to be a tossup, with perhaps a slight edge to the PCs in public opinion polls. If the PCs are successful, it would mark the 6th consecutive provincial vote where an incumbent government was tossed from power, an ominous sign for the federal Liberals as their provincial counterparts would have been removed from power in 5 of those 6 elections. This is also unusual for NL in that incumbent governments have been reelected at least twice after their initial win.

At this point, polls have consistently shown that the incumbent Liberal Premier, Dwight Ball, is not overly popular. The Liberals since regaining power in 2015 slipped fairly dramatically after their first austerity budget, although they have recovered moderately since that time. The PCs have at least partly succeeded in rebranding themselves after the Muskrat Falls debacle during their last government with Ches Crosbie, son of the national icon John Crosbie at the helm. Perhaps more remarkably, the NDP under Allison Coffin has managed to field only 14 candidates out of the 40 seats up for grabs, this is largely attributed to the snap election call Premier Ball made earlier this spring that limited the NDP’s recruitment and nomination process. The Newfoundland and Labrador Party, with nearly a comparable number of candidates to the NDP, has likewise been unable to make much headway despite a widespread feeling of malaise with both parties.

Thus the election might be seen as more in line with other recent provincial results from British Columbia and New Brunswick, where the incumbents were thought to have a decent shot at reelection, perhaps won the popular vote but narrowly lost in seats. In contrast with New Brunswick, PEI and Quebec, however, the disenchantment in NL will not likely lead to a dramatic breakthrough for new parties.

The last election was characterized by lopsided margins in many ridings, chiefly won by the Liberals, including 3 ridings won by over 90% of the vote (very unusual for contested parliamentary elections). This lack of voting efficiency might prevent their return to power, but if a swing to the PCs is modest and consistent throughout the province, a wide margin in 2015 might also serve to limit their loses. The PC gains will likewise be limited by the fact that the NDP is not on the ballot in 26 out of the 40 ridings, making the Liberals a likely repository of progressive votes that might otherwise have gone NDP orange.

At the end of the day, however, the modest swings necessary to pick up seats in St. John’s and environs, and the Avalon peninsula, will likely push the PCs to at least a plurality, if not a majority of seats. The model shows that while a PC majority is the most probable outcome, a Liberal minority (propped up by the NDP) is also quite possible. Less probable is a PC minority (if they get 19 or 20 seats and persuade an opposition member to assume the speakership), and last in the order of probability would be the Liberals returning to power with an overall majority.

While St. John’s environs and the Avalon is key to PC prospects of winning, Labrador may ultimately prove decisive in the overall result. The model currently shows the PCs winning Labrador West by 6 votes over the NDP (their only realistic hope outside of St. John’s), and Lake Melville by 3 votes over the Liberals. Other areas of critical PC gains would be certain ridings in Eastern and Central Newfoundland, such as Placentia West – Bellevue and Grand Falls-Windsor-Buchans.

The Liberals would not be shut out in any NL region except for suburban St. John’s, where the PCs are projected to take all 6 seats. They would be strongest in western Newfoundland around the Humber region and Corner Brook. The NDP, for their part, could realistically hope to retain 2 St. John’s seats – those of St. John’s Centre and St. John’s East Quidi Vidi.

Overall, the NL election continues a trend of general disenchantment with Liberal provincial governments recently seen across Canada, but it will probably differ from many of the other previous provincial contests in that third parties, with small slates of candidates, have next to no chance of any dramatic breakthrough in tomorrow’s vote. The biggest reverberations could be felt nationally, however, where at the end of 2015 Liberals held power nationally and in 7 provinces … at the end of 2019 it may well be only Yukon and Nova Scotia with Liberal governments if the one time seeming invincibility of the Liberal brand erodes so far that the Liberals are dethroned in Ottawa as well. Liberal reelection in NL could help arrest that erosion of strength, but right now the signs point in the direction of yet further Liberal decline.

P.E.I. Set to Make History

It is down to the wire in the elections in Canada’s smallest province and the Green Party has a solid chance of forming the next government.

The overall prediction takes into account the last poll showing the PCs closing the gap – coupled with a strong showing in eastern King’s County I predict a tie in seats and popular vote between them and the Greens. The Liberals, with the remainder of seats, could potentially boost the Green Party led by the popular Peter Bevan-Barker, into power.

I believe this would be the first instance of the Green Party winning power in the Western Hemisphere.

That said, the caveat is that 10 out of 27 total seats are very marginal, most of those with Green wins, this the range of plausible scenarios includes a small majority of either the Greens or the PCs. Since many of the races are localized, I will not pretend to be familiar with the local nuances of personality and politics on the island. This model is polls-based, and the smallest variance in competitive ridings could make a considerable difference in terms of the outcome.

That said, here is my prediction:

Green 34.8 % and 12 seats

PC 34.0% and 12 seats

Lib 27.5% and 3 seats

NDP 3.65% and 0 seats

I predict incumbent Premier Wade McLaughlin will loose his Charlottetown-area seat of Stanhope-Marshfield to the Greens, but the Liberals are likely to hang onto Evangeline-Miscouche, Tignish-Palmer Road and, less certain, Alberton-Bloomfield.

The PCs will be strong in the eastern King County area, with solid wins in:

Souris-Elmira, Georgetown-Pownal, Belfast-Murray River, Mermaid-Stratford, Stratford-Keppoch and Morell-Donagh. They are projected to have a narrow edge over the Greens in Montague-Kilmuir.

They are also slated to win Rustico-Emerald, Borden-Kinkora and Kensington-Malpeque, as well as the Charlottetown-area riding of Brackley-Hunter River.

Out in western Prince County they might edge out the Liberals in O’Leary-Inverness.

The Greens have consistently polled strong in both Charlottetown and Summerside, and are projected to sweep these areas. In addition, the Greens are projected to pull out tight wins in Cornwall-Meadowbank and New Haven-Rocky point in eastern P.E.I. and Tyne Valley-Sherbrooke in western P.E.I.

Both the Summerside ridings of Wilmot and South Drive are projected to go Green, with perhaps not as wide as a margin as what some polls might indicate.

The Charlottetown ridings of Belvedere, Victoria Park and West Royalty are believed to be more solidly Green than Winsloe and Brighton.

Hillsborough Park, after the tragic death of Green candidate Josh Underhay in a canoeing accident, will have a postponed by-election which will likely see a Green MLA from that riding as well.

Thus, election night may see the Greens with 11 actual wins, with the Hillsborough Park election potentially tying the PCs.

The Liberals may opt not to prop up a Green minority but given their competition for many of the same left-leaning voters and the excitement surrounding the Green breakthrough, they may find it more costly to not support the Greens.

As tragic as the circumstances were in causing the Hillsborough Park by-election postponement, a win there putting them over the top in the next several weeks may not seem like a long time, considering that Greens on this side of the Atlantic have had to wait decades before having any kind of breakthrough such as what we are expecting to see today.

Historic indeed.

Alberta Votes

Alberta election –

UCP wins majority of 59 seats with 48% of vote – everything else outside of Edmonton or not listed below

NDP wins 27 seats with 39% of vote – complete Edmonton sweep, Calgary Foothills, Calgary Buffalo, Calgary Varsity and Lethbridge East

Alberta Party wins 1 seat with 10% of vote – Calgary Elbow

Liberal Party 0 seats with 2% of vote

Can Phil Flip Tennessee ???

Can Phil flip Tennessee?

It is certainly possible, but by no means a sure thing.  Since Phil Bredesen’s first gubernatorial win in 2002, the map has gotten that much redder, the terrain that much steeper.  As evidenced by the below graph, showing a weighted number of public office holders by party, Tennessee emerged from the Second World War with a super strong Democratic ascendancy, to relative bipartisanship between the 1960s and early 2000s, to a strong Republican ascendancy beginning to manifest itself towards the end of Bredesen’s governorship.  But as the state’s politics continue to realign, it is possible that new combinations of voter support could push the former Governor over the finish line first.

The suburbs around Nashville were instrumental in making what was previously a strong Democratic Middle division of the state more of a bipartisan swing state (helping George W. Bush win over native son Al Gore Jr. in 2000) and helped initiate the change of the State Senate from Democratic to Republican.  In 2010, a watershed year to the state Republican party, the rural areas eventually followed suit en masse, with the effective collapse of the traditional yellow-dog centrist, rural Democratic vote in the remaining Middle and Western divisions of the state.  Thus, while the Donald Trump Presidential ticket in 2016 carried several previously yellow dog (Mondale and McGovern voting) counties to record levels of support for the Republican Party, the phenomenon of Democratic Party decline in the rural counties predated the populist campaign of Trump and therefore should be seen as more of a long-term dynamic that will determine how each party positions itself to influence future elections.

This is not to say that there aren’t ‘yellow-dog’ recapture votes to be had for the Bredesen campaign. As previously noted in the 2017 Alabama Senate race where Doug Jones eked out a narrow win, his campaign was much more dependent on urban votes that has previously been the case for Democrats in Alabama.  But several strong Trump (previously staunch Democratic) counties in the northwest portion of the state noticeably shifted towards the Democrats, even if they remained a lighter shade of red.  This could well be the case for the Bredesen campaign in Tennessee, where some of the same yellow-dog counties which supported Trump in 2016 return to the Democratic fold.  This could be seen as a nod to a more ‘traditional’ style of state politics which is less partisan and based on the personality of the candidate – the centrist Bredesen remains highly regarded for his two terms as Governor.

His opponent, U.S. Representative Marsha Blackburn from suburban Williamson County, is by her own admission more partisan, at least in the sense that she has fully embraced the Donald Trump campaign and as seen as a staunch supporter of the President’s agenda.  Even before Trump, Blackburn’s style of politics was seen as a shift towards a more ideologically defined approach than the traditional pragmatism of some of the state’s GOP elder statesmen such as Howard Baker Jr.  In adding Trump’s confrontational style to the mix, however, Blackburn’s partisan and ideological edges are likely amplified, which account for a more polarized opinion about her persona than Bredesen.

Clearly every vote will count for Bredesen in what is now a much more red-leaning state than when he won his first mandate as Governor.  Some traditional rural vote recapture will be necessary for him to win, and his campaign deliberately disavowing partisanship (to the point of openly opposing the Democratic party line on Brent Cavanaugh’s U.S. Supreme Court nomination and Chuck Schumer’s Democratic Senate leadership) could help entice more traditionalist Tennessee voters in the rural counties back in the fold.

In terms of number of votes, however, Bredesen is far more dependent on suburban and urban votes if he is to have a realistic shot at victory.  In the same time that the rural areas have swung more sharply towards Republicans, there is some evidence that the larger urban counties – Knox and Hamilton/Chattanooga (which traditionally supported Republicans even as the state as a whole did not) are less instrumental in Republican wins, and have even trended away from the same increases in overall Republican support.  Rutherford/Murfreesboro, more suburban and anchored by a large public university, basically had static levels of Republican presidential support between 2012 and 2016, and Williamson County was one of four counties statewide which saw a decrease in levels of Republican support during those same presidential election years.  The largest cities – Nashville and Memphis, which at one time could contribute to Republican margins (more so in Memphis/Shelby than Nashville) have become increasingly Democratic in their support, with Hillary Clinton winning close to or over 60% support in each county in 2016.  This could be likened to an I-24 strategy for a state Democratic renaissance, loosely based on the key cities on that section of interstate (Chattanooga, Murfreesboro, Nashville and Clarksville) that may increasingly trend Democratic and help make the state more competitive.

What a fairly tight Bredesen (Democratic) victory looked like back in 2002

What any Democratic victory in Tennessee would probably look like in 2018

This race will be indicative of overall state political trends in the future, since the Republicans have adopted with Trump a more aggressive, confrontational approach, which may or may not work for Republicans further down the ballot.  In the larger urban areas, can the centrist Bredesen count on a large turnout of Democrats who might otherwise prefer a more activist, progressive approach?  In the suburban areas and smaller metropolitan areas (i.e. Chattanooga) will the electorate, perhaps more preferential to moderation than firebrand populism, continue to trend more towards the Democrats?  Will the rural areas, more amenable to conservative populism but also cognizant of actual candidates and their record, regardless of party, return at least in part to the Democratic fold?

For Bredesen, and Tennessee Democrats in the longer term, they need a decisive “yes” to all the above questions – an urban progressive base who can still be relied upon to support moderates, suburbs and smaller metro areas becoming increasingly more competitive, and rural areas, at least for the time being, who can still support centrist, pragmatic Democrats of an earlier era when the state was considerably more blue.

Tennessee Senate 2018D

Democratic Party to Win Full Control U.S. Congress + Majority of Governorships

Final 2018 Midterm Prediction

Governors  D – 27 R – 23

D Gains – Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Wisconsin

R Gains – Alaska (from IND)

Governor 2018 Final

Senate D – 51 R 49 (includes to IND who caucus with D)

D Gains – Arizona, Nevada, Tennessee

R Gains – North Dakota

Senate 2018 Final

U.S. House D – 235 R – 200

D Gains largest in Pennsylvania (6); California (5); Florida (4); New Jersey (4); Virginia (3)

U.S. House 2018 Final A

Legault’s CAQ Likely to Fall Short of Outright Majority

Legault’s CAQ Likely to Fall Short of Outright Majority

CAQ – 31.34% – 59 seats

Liberals – 29.36% – 44 seats

PQ – 20.69% – 16 seats

QS – 16.37% – 6 seats

All others – 2.24% – 0 seats

For the first time in 52 years, Quebec appears poised to award electoral victory to a party other than the Liberals or Parti Quebecois (PQ). While the Coalition Avenir Quebec (CAQ), a right-leaning, moderately populist party has led public opinion polls for some months prior to the election campaign, it has fallen back during the campaign to the lower 30s, perhaps a point or two ahead of the incumbent Liberals. The PQ support has dropped to around one fifth of the electorate, with most of the gains going towards the fledgling centre-left, sovereigntist Quebec solidaire (QS). Given the longstanding tendency of Liberals to garner wide margins in non-francophone ridings, a near tie in the popular vote practically means that the Liberals, with less voting efficiency, will place second in the seat count.

This synopsis is a less narrative and briefer than usual, standing as a testament to the extra time spent fine tuning a riding-by-riding model that will see a large number of constituencies won with only a third of the vote or less, with margins of less than 5% in roughly 30 ridings. Since there are many ridings very closely contested with three-way (and in some instances four-way) splits, the potential range of seats won for each party is listed below at the level of support predicted above.

CAQ – 37 minimum – 59 likely – 70 maximum

Lib – 35 minimum – 44 likely – 55 maximum

PQ – 7 minimum – 16 likely – 24 maximum

QS – 4 minimum – 6 likely – 11 maximum

As the clear gainers in support, and as supported by my riding-by-riding analysis, neither the CAQ nor the QS are projected to lose any of the seats that they currently hold. Having gained the Quebec City riding of Louis Hebert in a by-election, this is potentially the most marginal of all the seats that they currently hold. The CAQ has as their base of support a large number of ridings outside of Montreal, in the predominantly agricultural, rural, francophone areas in the southern portion of the province. The CAQ also has strong levels of support in the suburban/exurban Laurentides region outside of Montreal, (where leader Francois Legault has a seat in L’Assomption), and strong pockets of support in the Quebec City region. They may not be able to achieve a critical Montreal breakthrough that would pave the way for a strong CAQ majority, however they expect to build on their strength in the Laurentides, Monteregie (south of Montreal), Quebec City and rural areas elsewhere.

The QS for their part has 4 riding strongholds in the eastern part of Montreal, and expect to do better in the Montreal region than elsewhere, although they do have long shot hopes of pickups in Sherbrooke, Rimouski and Taschereau (Quebec City). Spokesperson Manon Masse, who has spearheaded the 2018 campaign, represents Sainte-Marie-Saint-Jacques, which although marginal in 2014 is expected to easily remain in QS hands this time around.

The strength of the provincial Liberal party in Quebec has traditionally rested in both the west end of Montreal and in the Ottawa River Valley, areas that are either more amenable to federalism or are non-francophone (non-francophone ridings being a subset of a larger number of pro-federalist ridings). The Liberals should also retain most of the ridings in Laval and eastern Montreal that they already hold. It is currently projected that incumbent Liberal Premier Philippe Couillard will retain Roberval, in the Lac St. Jean region of the province, and the Liberals will likely hang on to small pockets of support elsewhere in northern and rural Quebec.

The Liberals are likely to lose 10 seats (all to the CAQ) by a significant margin, ridings largely concentrated in the Mauricie and Quebec City Regions.

Champlain
Charlesbourg
Charlevoix – Cote de Beaupre
Chauveaux
Jean Lesage
La Prairie
Maskinonge
Montmorency
Portneuf
Vanier – Les Rivieres

Seven ridings that the Liberals currently hold (or else won in 2014) but are likely to lose, by between 3 and 10 percentage points, (again, all to the CAQ) consist of several ridings on the south shore – either in the Monteregie, Eastern Townships or Central Quebec (Beauce/Levis) regions.

Argenteuil
Beauce Sud
Bellechasse
Brome Missisquoi
Megantic
Richmond
Trois Rivieres

In addition, they are likely to lose the eastern Montreal constituency of Laurier-Dorion to Quebec Solidaire.

Finally, the truly marginal loses, by less than 3 points. Quebec Solidaire is projected to pick up the Maurice Richard riding (formerly known as Cremazie) by roughly half a percentage point. All other loses below are to the CAQ, broadly distributed throughout Quebec outside of Montreal.

Cote du Sud
Laviolette – St. Maurice (merger of 2 separate constituencies, both previously held by Liberals)
Lotbinière-Frontenac
Orford
Saint Francois

The Liberals are expected to barely retain 6 ridings, most of which are located either in northern Quebec or the Lac St. Jean or lower St. Lawrence river regions.

Abitibi-Est – likely to retain over CAQ, or more distantly, the PQ
Dubuc – likely to retain over CAQ, or more distantly, the PQ
Iles de la Madeline – likely to retain over PQ, the CAQ underperformed in this riding last election
Rouyn-Noranda-Témiscamingue – likely a 4-way split riding with all 4 main parties in contention
Sainte-Rose – over the CAQ, likely the only riding that the CAQ could win nearest Montreal
Sherbrooke – again, likely a 4 way split riding

The Liberals could still lose the following ridings, but the projected margins of victory are more comfortable between 3 to 10 points.

Huntingdon – over the CAQ
Jean Talon – over the CAQ
Ungava – over the PQ, more distantly the CAQ

The Parti-Quebecois is facing an historic defeat in the 5 decades of its’ existence, however it can still count on a base level of support of an estimated 7 constituencies in traditionally separatist-friendly territory, in the lower St. Lawrence and Lac St. Jean/North Shore regions.

In the Laurentides/Monteregie regions closer to Montreal, the PQ is looking at 6 losses very likely to occur in the following ridings, all to the CAQ.

Rousseau
St. Jean
St. Jerome
Sanguinet
Terrebonne
Vachon

Likewise, in the same general vicinity of the province, the PQ are looking at 7 more likely losses, with a margin of between 3 – 10%, again, all to the CAQ, (except the very remote change of the QS picking up Taschereau in Quebec City instead of the CAQ).

Beauharnois
Berthier
Bertrand
Richelieu
Taillon
Taschereau
Vercheres

Unfortunately for the PQ, none of their losses are projected to be by a margin smaller than 3%, which makes it quite probable that they will have less than 20 seats after Monday’s vote.

They are expected to narrowly retain 5 ridings with less than a 3 percentage margin.
Pointe Aux Trembles and Rosemont, in east Montreal, are expected to be tight races with the QS but where the PQ are projected to prevail overall.
Chicoutimi, Joliette and Marie-Victorin, all considered traditional separatist-friendly territory, are projected to remain with the PQ in the face of strong challenges from the CAQ.

Finally, the PQ might comfortably retain the following ridings, but with a margin of less than 10%, mostly in the northern or Lac St. Jean regions.

Abitibi Ouest – longtime incumbent Francois Gendron retiring after nearly 42 years, the CAQ and, to a lesser extent, the Liberals might gain the riding

Bourget – in eastern Montreal – the CAQ is expected to perform well here and is seen as equally likely to gain the riding as the QS, although currently projected to be a comfortable PQ win.

Duplessis – comfortable PQ win projected over Liberals, CAQ coming in strong third

Jonquiere – projected PQ win by 4 points over CAQ

Thus, the bottom line appears that the Liberals and PQ will retrench to their traditional strongholds as they would during their time out of power – the CAQ are poised to make significant gains in southern, rural Quebec, around the outskirts of greater Montreal in the Laurentides/Monteregie and in Quebec City. The QS is projected to build on their strength in eastern Montreal and mount strong, if long shot races for Taschereau, Sherbrooke and Rimouski.

This election will showcase both the strengths and weaknesses of all parties.
The Liberals will consistently demonstrate, (by virtue of language and propensities towards federalism, if nothing else), a floor of around 40 seats and 30 percent of the vote, but with only getting a projected 20% of the francophone vote, are limited in terms of gains outside the Montreal and Ottawa River regions. Low polling in particular in the growing Laurentides region outside of Montreal may portend to longer term structural problems in the future.

The Parti Quebecois, beset by a split in the sovereigntist vote with the QS, will fall back to reliable pockets of support in the Lac St. Jean/North Shore/Lower St. Lawrence regions and will struggle to retain a footing in Montreal. QS will struggle for viability outside of eastern Montreal, despite coming close to the PQ in popular vote overall. While it has been attempted to unite the two parties, it remains to be seen if united they can make inroads in the CAQ-held territory where the electorate has, by many accounts, wearied of the sovereignty project.

The CAQ, meanwhile, has gained in most of the rural, southern areas outside of Montreal, including in the critical suburban/exurban ring around the city where the PQ has traditionally fared well. However, apart from one or two ridings in the Laval/Montreal area, they are not rated as having a change at many seats in the area, which could dampen their prospects for a strong majority, if any majority at all. It remains to be seen if a centre-right party can make headway in Montreal without modifying a number of items in their platform (federally right-of-centre parties have been completely shut out of Montreal over the past 3 decades).

In conclusion, then, Quebec appears to be split into three separate voting blocs – the core federalist/Liberal vote; the centrist or centre-right francophone vote which has disavowed the traditional Liberal/PQ choices and the core separatist vote, split between the PQ and the QS. Arguably the PQ and the QS could reunify and make additional headway in several constituencies, most likely at the expense of the CAQ, but unless the sovereigntist project is once again slated to hold wider sway with francophone voters, they too will encounter their own ceiling. It may not be too long to discern the emergent trends in Quebec provincial politics – if Legault does end up with a minority it will be likely less than two years before the next election, if past minority governments in Quebec are any indication.

PQ Elections 2018 Final