Current predictions are showing the potential of the UK Conservatives to take 370 seats with 41.22% of the vote; Labour in second place, though significantly lower than 2 years ago with 187 seats and 29.57% of the vote; the Scottish Nationalists are the third largest party with 48 seats and 3.35% of the overall vote (roughly 40% in Scotland); the Liberal Democrats get just under 15% of the vote at 14.86% and 23 seats.

While I am predicting a tightening of the polls, probably a 7 point margin and 345 seats for the Conservatives (not too different than today’s widely anticipated MRP poll showing 359 seats for the Conservatives to 211 for Labour); if the current polling of a 12 point margin holds, and the Conservatives do win 370 seats, that would be their best showing in 32 years, while Labour, below 200 seats, would not have had a worse result since 1935.

The MRP poll does bear special mention since it accurately predicted the Conservative loss of majority in 2017; almost the only poll to do so, some time in advance of the vote. The methodology, including much more extensive interviewing (50,000 interviews instead of the couple of thousand or so for most other polls) samples on a number of factors that can help with constituency projections (the most widely cited examples include high income finance workers voting leave and university students voting remain in the 2016 Brexit referendum.)

The problem with the poll so far out in advance of the election, in addition to the attention it receives for it’s predictive abilities, is that the MRP poll may in turn influence voting behavior. Tony Blair once said that he didn’t think the UK was a landslide country, and the statistics bear this out, with few elections since 1945 having a margin of more than 10 points between the victor and the second place party. People on the Conservative side may become less motivated to vote if they believe their party will win big (although the additional stakes with Brexit will likely make any potential decline in turnout negligible.) Alternatively, Labour and Liberal Democrats may coalesce around the party more apt to beat the Conservatives in a given riding, and there may be a foreboding sense of their part that they have to at least cut Johnson’s majority down to size. That sense of foreboding could also motivate many Labour voters to simply not show up, especially as Jeremy Corbyn continues to deal with rifts in his party.

Ultimately, however, while polls suggestive of a large win can cut both ways, both for the leading party as well as the trailing one, the fact that the Conservatives have already been in power for 9 years, the existence of a core opposition to Conservative policies such as austerity and the relatively rare occurrences of landslides suggest that some tightening is more likely than not. In addition to Brexit, the state of the National Health Service (NHS) is also figuring as a major campaign issue, with Corbyn accusing Conservative policy as providing for the privatization of the decade’s old publicly funded health insurance program through any prospective post-Brexit trade agreements with the United States. Those sections of the electorate more concerned with the NHS could effectively put a floor under Labour support.

This isn’t to say that the Conservatives are at this point in danger of losing the election, however. As witness the polls showing spikes in support at various times for the Brexit Party and Liberal Democrats in the last parliament, there does appear to be a general malaise with inaction on Brexit and the uncertainty that brings. For many, that may mean the Conservatives by default – Johnson’s approval ratings are, while not stratospheric, on the whole much stronger than Corbyn’s; Labour has done their fair share of struggling in the campaign (most recently on charges of not doing enough to combat antisemitism); the Liberal Democrats, while up from 2017 on an unequivocal Remain stance, are not going moving past 15% in the polls.

While Corbyn is seen as an effective campaigner (to some extent, at least), his subterranean net approval ratings ranging from negative 35 to negative 60, in contrast with Johnson’s negative 10 to positive 5, is likely sufficient by itself, barring some major unforeseen event, to keep Corbyn out of Number 10. Arguably another Labour leader other than Corbyn could have given Johnson’s Conservatives a much stronger challenge in their bid for a fourth term, although a different leader would still need to navigate the various divisions in the party (i.e. between the moderate Blair and Brown Labour supporters and those of the Corbyn and his Momentum movement; between those who are solid remainers and the Euro-skeptics, etc.)

In addition, while the map above shows Labour hanging on in the predominantly large urban areas, less evident is the migration of many blue collar workers in the heavy pro-Brexit (and Labour-voting) areas towards the Conservatives, which appears to be in line with the emergence of the overall Conservative populist movement in many democracies today.

Thus in conclusion, the race is the Conservatives’ to lose. Labour may close the gap, but internal divisions and an unpopular leader (with the country at large) suggest it will not be enough. Both Conservative and Labour parties have experienced significant fractures during the Brexit vote, the win for Labour in losing is that they may possibly be forced to deal with those fractures first. A Conservative win may ultimately be hard to top in the next election in 2023/2024 – not only will they still have fractures that they may or may not deal with, but any disruption or Brexit shocks will likely be laid at their feet, especially with a majority larger than any they have had in the last seven elections.

Next post will deal with Northern Ireland, then Scotland/Wales, and finally all three major parties.